Hedge Fund Investing by Kevin Mirabile - Closing Thoughts
So we made it through all 12 chapters of Kevin Mirabile’s “Hedge Fund Investing.” Here’s what stuck with me after going through the whole thing.
So we made it through all 12 chapters of Kevin Mirabile’s “Hedge Fund Investing.” Here’s what stuck with me after going through the whole thing.
So we made it through the whole book. Every chapter, every character, every messed up financial instrument. And now I want to step back and share some thoughts on what this book really means. Not just as a finance story, but as a story about people, systems, and how badly things can go wrong when nobody’s paying attention.
This is the last post in the series. We have been through 83 chapters spread across three volumes, covering everything from what a stock option actually is to coding up stochastic volatility solvers and American option pricing algorithms. If you have followed along from the beginning, thank you for sticking with it. If you jumped in halfway, that is fine too. Let me try to pull all of it together.
Chapters 82 and 83 are the “put your money where your mouth is” chapters. After hundreds of pages of theory, equations, and diagrams, Wilmott hands you actual working code. Visual Basic code for Excel, to be precise. These are not toy examples. They implement real pricing models for real financial products, from plain American calls to exotic Parisian options to stochastic volatility to credit risk. Let me walk you through what each program does and why it matters.
In the first part of Chapter 12, we covered fund administrators and prime brokers. Now we get into the other critical service providers: auditors, lawyers, and technology firms. These are less flashy but just as important. A hedge fund without a good auditor is like a restaurant without a health inspector. Maybe everything is fine. Maybe you don’t want to know.
The epilogue of The Big Short is called “Everything Is Correlated.” And that title carries more weight than it first appears. The financial system, the government response, the bailouts, the lack of accountability, the people who got rich from causing the disaster, and the ordinary people who lost everything - it was all connected. And not in the way Wall Street’s risk models assumed.
When you think about hedge funds, you think about traders and portfolio managers. Maybe a genius founder in a corner office making billion-dollar bets. But behind every hedge fund is a small army of service providers doing work that nobody talks about. Chapter 12 is about those people.
Chapter 81 tackles a problem that looks simple on the surface but gets surprisingly deep: how do you calculate a multi-dimensional integral when you cannot do it with pen and paper? If you can write an option price as an integral (and for many European options on multiple assets, you can), then all you need is a good way to evaluate that integral numerically. Wilmott shows three approaches, and the last one is genuinely clever.
This is the chapter where everything falls apart. Not slowly. Not gracefully. Like a building that has been rotting from the inside for years and one Tuesday morning just folds in on itself while people are still walking past it on the sidewalk.
Part 1 covered how to prepare for due diligence and evaluate a fund’s investment process. Now comes the hard stuff. Risk management, operations, the business model, and the part nobody wants to think about: fraud.
Chapter 80 is where Wilmott shows you a completely different way to price options. Forget partial differential equations. Forget finite differences. Instead, just simulate random stock price paths, calculate what the option would pay on each path, average the results, and discount back to today. That is Monte Carlo simulation in a nutshell. It sounds almost too simple to work, but it is one of the most powerful tools in all of quantitative finance.
This chapter is where it all starts to unravel. And it opens not with the heroes of this story, but with the guy who made the single biggest trading loss in Wall Street history. His name is Howie Hubler.
Due diligence. Sounds boring. But this is the chapter where you learn how to not lose your money to the next Madoff. So maybe pay attention.
There is an old saying in science: being right too early is indistinguishable from being wrong. Chapter 8 of The Big Short is basically that saying stretched into the most painful period of Michael Burry’s life. And honestly, reading it felt personal. Because anyone who has ever been the only person in the room who sees a problem - and then gets punished for pointing it out - will recognize every single page of this chapter.
Chapter 79 is about what happens when your problem has two random factors. Convertible bonds with stochastic interest rates. Exotic options with stochastic volatility. Barrier options where you model both the stock and the rates. These are real problems that real desks face, and they need two-factor numerical methods.
In the previous chapter we built the explicit finite-difference method. It works, it is easy to code, but it has that annoying stability constraint: your time step must be tiny relative to your asset step. Chapter 78 shows how to remove that constraint and get better accuracy at the same time. The price? The code gets a bit more complicated. But as Wilmott says, the extra complexity is worth it.
Why do hedge fund managers charge so much? And does paying more actually get you better results? Chapter 10 of Mirabile’s book tackles this. Turns out, the way you structure a fund’s fees and terms has a real effect on how the manager behaves. And how the manager behaves determines your returns.
Chapter 7 of The Big Short is called “The Great Treasure Hunt,” and I think it is the most frustrating chapter in the whole book. Not because it is boring. Because it shows you that every institution that was supposed to protect the system - the rating agencies, the regulators, the big banks - was either clueless, corrupt, or both.
Chapter 77 is where we stop talking about pricing theory and start actually building a pricer. This is the chapter where the Black-Scholes equation stops being a formula on paper and becomes code on a screen. If you have ever used the binomial model, congratulations, you already know the basic idea. Finite differences are just a more powerful, more flexible version of the same concept.
You would think measuring how well a hedge fund did is simple. Fund went up 10%? Great. Down 3%? Bad. Done.
There is something almost too perfect about the setting. The biggest annual conference for the subprime mortgage bond industry takes place in Las Vegas. In a fake Italian palace. Inside a casino specifically designed to make you lose track of time, money, and your grip on reality.
So you want diversified hedge fund exposure but don’t want to pick individual managers yourself. Chapter 8 covers your two main options: multistrategy funds and funds of hedge funds (FoF). There is also a third option, index replication, that has been gaining traction. Same goal, very different execution. Let’s break it down.
We have reached the final part of Wilmott’s massive book. Part Six: Numerical Methods and Programs. This is where all the theory meets reality. Because in practice, you almost never get a nice closed-form formula. You get a PDE and a computer.
Every chapter of this book introduces a different kind of weirdo who saw the crisis coming. Michael Burry was the data obsessive. Steve Eisman was the loud angry truth-teller. And now we meet Charlie Ledley and Jamie Mai, two guys who started a hedge fund in a friend’s garage in Berkeley, California, with $110,000 in a Schwab account. They called it Cornwall Capital Management. Nobody asked them to do this. Nobody told them they should. They just kind of… did it.
Every year around December, Wall Street gets really interesting. Bonus season. Traders who made money want a fat check. Banks want to keep their best people but also not go broke. And nobody really knows if a trader who made a fortune this year was skilled or just lucky.
Convertible arbitrage sounds complicated. And honestly, the mechanics are not trivial. But the core idea is surprisingly simple. You buy a convertible bond. You short the stock of the same company. Then you try to profit from the difference.
This is the chapter that made me put the book down and stare at the wall for a while. Not because it’s complicated. Because it’s cruel. Chapter 4 is where Michael Lewis shows you the actual human beings getting chewed up by the machine. And the chapter title - “How to Harvest a Migrant Worker” - is not a metaphor. It is literally what happened.
This chapter is about bond nerds. Specifically, hedge fund managers who make money by finding small price differences between bonds that should be priced the same (or very close). The strategies are called fixed income relative value and credit arbitrage. They sound boring. But the math behind them is wild.
And now for something completely morbid. That is literally how Wilmott opens Chapter 74. We are talking about life settlements and viaticals. Contracts that are, to put it bluntly, about death.
This chapter introduces one of the most entertaining characters in the whole book. His name is Greg Lippmann, he is a bond trader at Deutsche Bank, and he is exactly the kind of person you would never trust with your money. Which is exactly why his story is so good.
In Part 1 we covered how long/short equity funds work, the five strategy types, and how they construct portfolios. Now let’s look at the business side: fees, redemptions, historical performance, and how investors evaluate these managers.
Every chapter so far has been about financial options. Contracts you buy and sell in markets. But the word “option” just means a choice, and choices show up everywhere. Should you shut down a factory that is losing money? Should you invest in a project now or wait? Should you suspend production when prices drop and restart when they recover? Chapter 73 of Wilmott’s book shows that the same math we use for financial derivatives can answer these questions. This is the world of real options.
The chapter title is “In the Land of the Blind.” There is a proverb: “In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king.” Michael Burry literally had one eye. He lost his left eye to cancer when he was two years old. Lewis is not being subtle here, and I love him for it.
Wilmott opens Chapter 72 with a confession: “I don’t believe much of what I’m writing, and by the end of the chapter I hope you’ll see why.” That is an unusual way to start a textbook chapter, but it captures something real about energy derivatives. The models are borrowed from other markets, the assumptions are shakier than usual, and the underlying commodities behave in ways that break standard financial theory. But you have to start somewhere.
Long/short equity is the most popular hedge fund strategy. It’s also the oldest. The very first hedge fund, started by Alfred Winslow Jones in 1949, was a long/short equity fund. He turned $100,000 into $4.8 million over 20 years. People noticed. By 1968, the SEC counted 140 funds copying his approach.
Chapter 1 of The Big Short is called “A Secret Origin Story.” And it really is one. Michael Lewis introduces us to Steve Eisman, a guy who stumbled into the subprime mortgage world almost by accident, got a front row seat to the ugliest corner of American finance, and slowly turned from a believer into the angriest skeptic on Wall Street.
Global macro is the strategy people think of when they hear “hedge fund.” Big bets on currencies. Shorting entire economies. George Soros breaking the Bank of England. That kind of thing.
Inflation eats your money. Slowly, usually, but sometimes fast. If you hold a regular bond, inflation erodes the value of every coupon and the principal repayment. Index-linked bonds solve this by tying payments to an inflation index like the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the US or the Retail Price Index (RPI) in the UK. Chapter 71 of Wilmott’s book looks at how to model inflation and price these products. The answer turns out to be messier than you might hope.
Michael Lewis opens The Big Short with a confession. And it is one of the most honest things I have ever read from someone who worked on Wall Street.
The Epstein-Wilmott model from the previous two chapters gives us worst-case prices for interest rate products without assuming any probability distribution. But the basic version is, well, basic. It assumes rates move smoothly within bounds. Real interest rates jump. They follow cycles. They have a stochastic component that looks a lot like Brownian motion on short timescales. Chapter 70 adds bells and whistles to make the model more realistic while keeping its non-probabilistic spirit.
Chapter 3 is basically a timeline of the hedge fund industry. How it started small, got huge, almost died in 2008, and came back. If you want to understand where hedge funds are today, you need to know how they got here.
I just finished re-reading The Big Short by Michael Lewis, and honestly, it hits different every time. So I’m going to do something I’ve wanted to do for a while. I’m going to retell this book, chapter by chapter, in a way that makes sense even if you’ve never touched a finance textbook.
In Part 1 we covered the research behind hedge fund investing and how rich people, family offices, and endowments got into the game. Now let’s talk about the really big money: pension plans, sovereign wealth funds, and funds of funds. Plus, if hedge funds are so great, why doesn’t everyone just put 100% of their money there?
In the previous chapter, Wilmott introduced the Epstein-Wilmott model for interest rates: no probability, just bounds on where rates can go and how fast they move. We saw how to value bonds and generate the Yield Envelope. Chapter 69 takes this framework and applies it to real portfolios and more complex derivatives. Bond options, index amortizing rate swaps, convertible bonds. The nonlinear, non-probabilistic approach handles them all.
Hedge funds started back in the 1960s when Alfred Winslow Jones launched the first one. It was weird at the time because he used leverage and short selling. Nobody else was doing that. But the industry stayed small until the late 1980s.
Every interest rate model you have seen so far in this book assumes some form of random process. Brownian motion, mean reversion, stochastic volatility. They all start with “assume interest rates follow this stochastic differential equation” and then build a pricing framework on top. Chapter 68 of Wilmott’s book throws all of that out the window. No random walks. No probability distributions. No volatility parameters. Just bounds. This is the Epstein-Wilmott model, and it is refreshingly different.
In Part 1 we covered what alternative investments are and how hedge funds are structured. Now we get into the fun stuff. How do hedge funds actually make money? What strategies do they use? And how does leverage turn a 10% market gain into a 23% return?
In the previous chapter, we learned how to allocate money between risky and safe assets in continuous time. The answer was clean: hold a constant fraction in stocks and rebalance. But that result assumed the world follows a smooth lognormal random walk with no sudden jumps. What if you know that a crash could happen at any moment? Not a small dip, but a real crash, like October 1987. Chapter 67 of Wilmott’s book, written with Ralf Korn, tackles exactly this question. The answer is no longer a constant fraction, and the way the optimal allocation changes over time matches our intuition perfectly.
In the one-period portfolio models like Markowitz and CAPM, you make your investment decision once and then sit and wait. You cannot change your mind. But in real life, you check your portfolio, see how the market moved, and rebalance. You do this every day, every hour, maybe every minute. Chapter 66 of Wilmott’s book, based mostly on Merton’s work, develops the theory of continuous-time investment and portfolio rebalancing. The results are surprisingly elegant and give genuine practical insight.
Chapter 1 opens with a warning. If you’re new to hedge funds, you will get overwhelmed. There’s a lot of terminology. There’s a lot of moving pieces. But Mirabile does a good job laying the foundation here. Let’s walk through it.
So I picked up this book called Hedge Fund Investing: A Practical Approach to Understanding Investor Motivation, Manager Profits, and Fund Performance by Kevin R. Mirabile. And honestly, it’s one of those books that sounds intimidating but actually breaks things down pretty well.
One of the core assumptions behind most of quantitative finance is that stock returns are independent. What happened yesterday tells you nothing about today. The stock went up ten days in a row? Irrelevant. Tomorrow is a fresh coin toss. But is this really true? Chapter 65 of Wilmott’s book looks at the evidence for serial autocorrelation in stock returns and asks what happens to our models when returns are not independent.
Ask most options traders which parameter matters more for pricing: volatility or dividends. Almost everyone says volatility. And almost everyone is wrong. Chapter 64 of Wilmott’s book shows that for many common option structures, the sensitivity to dividend yield actually exceeds the sensitivity to volatility. Once you see the numbers, you start treating dividends very differently.
Here is something that should make every options trader stop and think. The “optimal” time to exercise an American option depends on who you are. The textbook answer assumes the holder is delta hedging. But if the holder were delta hedging, why would they buy the option in the first place? Chapter 63 of Wilmott’s book, based on a 1998 paper with Dr. Hyungsok Ahn, digs into this question and reaches a conclusion that is great news for option writers.
Would you rather have a guaranteed $5 million or a 50/50 shot at $10 million? Most people take the sure thing. Mathematically the expected value is the same. But something inside you says the safe option just feels better. That feeling is exactly what utility theory tries to capture, and Chapter 62 of Wilmott’s book lays down the framework for it.
Every derivatives textbook makes the same quiet assumption: option trading does not affect the stock price. The stock does its random walk thing, the option value follows, and hedging is just a passive activity. But think about this. In many markets, the nominal value of options traded exceeds the value of trade in the underlying stock itself. When everyone is delta hedging, they are all buying and selling the stock in predictable amounts at predictable times. Can we really pretend this has no effect? Chapter 61 of Wilmott’s book says no, and the consequences are fascinating.
Delta hedging is wonderful in theory. You adjust your position continuously, and risk vanishes. In practice, it is messy. You have to trade at discrete times. Transaction costs eat your lunch. And for some contracts, like barrier options or anything with a discontinuous payoff, the required hedge ratios become absurd. You end up buying and selling enormous quantities of the underlying at exactly the wrong moments. Chapter 60 of Wilmott’s book introduces static hedging as the cure for many of these headaches.
Almost everything in quantitative finance is built around one assumption: you hedge. You buy the option, you delta hedge, you eliminate risk, and the drift of the stock does not matter. Beautiful theory. But Chapter 59 of Wilmott’s book asks an uncomfortable question: what if you are not hedging?
The jump diffusion models from the previous chapter have a fundamental problem. You have to estimate the probability of a crash, and that is incredibly hard to do. How often does a 15% market drop happen? Once every 5 years? 10 years? 50 years? Nobody really knows. Chapter 58 of Wilmott’s book takes a completely different approach. Instead of guessing crash probabilities, it asks: what if the worst happens?
Here is a thing that bothers every honest quant at some point. The lognormal random walk, the thing Black-Scholes is built on, assumes that stock prices move smoothly. Small steps. Continuous paths. Nice and clean. But if you have ever watched a market during a crisis, you know that prices do not always walk. Sometimes they jump. Chapter 57 of Wilmott’s book tackles this head on and introduces jump diffusion models.
Every few chapters, Wilmott stops talking about theory and shows you a concrete product that exposes why the theory matters so much. Chapter 56 does exactly this. The cliquet option is a structured product that looks innocent on the surface but hides extreme sensitivity to volatility modeling. If you price it with the wrong volatility assumptions, you can be off by a factor of ten in your risk estimate. That is not a rounding error. That is a blowup waiting to happen.
Here is a frustrating reality of stochastic volatility models. You pick a model because it is tractable (Heston, anyone?). You get nice semi-closed-form solutions. But what if the model does not actually describe reality well? You have traded accuracy for mathematical convenience, and in finance, that trade can cost you real money.
Wilmott does not like the market price of risk. He says so right at the start of Chapter 54, and his reasoning is solid. The market price of volatility risk is not directly observable. You can only back it out from option prices, and that only works if the people setting those prices are using the same model you are. If you refit the model a few days later and get a different answer, was the market wrong before? Or is it wrong now? You end up chasing your own tail.
Most people who model stochastic volatility start by writing down a nice-looking equation and then try to fit it to data. Wilmott thinks this is backwards. In Chapter 53, he starts with the data and builds the model from the ground up. It is a refreshingly practical approach. Instead of picking a model because it is mathematically convenient, he asks: what does volatility actually do?
So we made it. Thirteen posts covering every chapter of Flash Boys by Michael Lewis. And now the big question: did any of it matter?
Let us start with an uncomfortable truth. The Black-Scholes equation has three main parameters: volatility, interest rate, and dividend yield. Of these three, not a single one is known with certainty. Sure, you know today’s stock price. You know the expiry date. But the stuff that actually matters for pricing? You are guessing. Chapter 52 of Wilmott’s book takes this discomfort and turns it into a pricing framework.
The book ends the way it started. With a cable buried under American soil and the people who live above it having no clue what it does.
Volatility is not constant. We knew that already. The deterministic volatility surface tries to fix this by making volatility a function of stock price and time. But the surface changes every time you recalibrate. The model is fundamentally incomplete.
This chapter hit me different than the rest of the book. Maybe because Sergey Aleynikov is from the former USSR, same as me. Maybe because I spent 20 years in IT and know what it feels like when non-technical people judge your work. Probably both.
You look at the market. Calls with the same expiry but different strikes have different implied volatilities. The Black-Scholes model says this should not happen. Constant volatility means one number for all strikes. But the market does not care what Black-Scholes says.
In Part 1 we talked about the misfits Brad recruited to build IEX. Now we get to the good stuff. They launched it. And then Goldman Sachs did something nobody expected.
You cannot see volatility. You cannot touch it. You cannot even measure it precisely at any given instant. And yet, it is the single most important input in options pricing. Get volatility wrong and nothing else matters. Get it right and you can make a lot of money.
Chapter 7 is called “An Army of One.” And it starts not with trading algorithms or secret cables. It starts with a guy on the subway on September 11, 2001.
Every time you buy or sell stock to rebalance your hedge, you pay a little toll. The bid-offer spread. The commission. The market impact. These are transaction costs, and they are the silent killer of options hedging strategies.
Black-Scholes says you should hedge continuously. Rebalance your portfolio every instant, forever, and all risk disappears like magic. Beautiful theory. Completely impossible in practice.
Chapter 6 is where everything gets real. Brad and his team stop talking about the problem and start building the solution. They quit their jobs, raise money, hire puzzle solvers, and design a stock exchange from scratch. And the centerpiece of the whole thing is a coil of fiber optic cable stuffed inside a box the size of a shoe.
Before we tear Black-Scholes apart, Wilmott wants to make something clear. This model is a triumph. It changed finance forever. Two of its three creators won the Nobel Prize. Everyone in derivatives uses it, from salesmen to traders to quants. Option prices are often quoted not in dollars but in volatility terms, with the understanding that you plug that number into Black-Scholes to get the price.
This chapter hit me personally. I’m from the former USSR myself. I know people exactly like Sergey Aleynikov. Brilliant programmers who left because the system wouldn’t let them be what they were meant to be. Reading this felt less like a book and more like a story someone told me over tea.
We are now entering Part 5 of Wilmott’s book: Advanced Topics. Everything so far was classical foundation. Lognormal random walks, Black-Scholes, delta hedging, portfolio theory. Well-established stuff. From here on out, we go beyond the standard model and into territories where things get interesting, controversial, and sometimes dangerous.
By the end of 2010, Brad’s team had built a weapon. Thor worked. It protected investors from getting front-run by high-frequency traders. But here’s the problem. They had built a defense against an enemy they barely understood.
All the math in the world does not help if the people using it are reckless, clueless, or dishonest. Chapter 44 is Wilmott’s tour through the greatest hits of derivatives disasters. These are not abstract case studies. Real people lost real billions, institutions collapsed, and careers ended. Some of these stories are tragic, some are farcical, and a few are both.
Every person I know who works in IT started from the bottom. Fixing cables, carrying equipment, dealing with angry users. Nobody hands you a corner office in tech. You earn it by touching the actual hardware. And that’s exactly why Ronan Ryan understood something that every Wall Street trader missed.
Value at Risk tells you what to expect on a normal day. But what about the days that are not normal? What about crashes? Chapter 43 introduces CrashMetrics, which is Wilmott’s own creation. If VaR is about routine market conditions, CrashMetrics is the opposite side of the coin. It is about fire sales, panic, and the far-from-orderly liquidation of assets.
Chapter 2 of Flash Boys is where we meet Brad Katsuyama. And honestly, this is where the book really starts cooking. Because Brad is not some Wall Street hotshot from Goldman Sachs. He’s a Canadian guy from Toronto who ended up in New York almost by accident.
Chapter 1 of Flash Boys opens like a heist movie. Two thousand workers are digging across America. They don’t know why. They don’t know what they are building. And they are told to keep their mouths shut.
We talked about Value at Risk (VaR) earlier in the book. You know the concept: estimate how much you can lose from your portfolio over a given time, with a given confidence level. Cool idea. But where do you get the actual numbers? Volatilities, correlations, credit data? Chapter 42 is about two systems that try to answer that question: RiskMetrics and CreditMetrics. Both came from JP Morgan, and both became industry standards.
If you hold a bond and the issuer might default, you want insurance. That is the basic idea behind credit derivatives. You pay someone a regular premium, and if the bad thing happens, they pay you. Chapter 41 of Wilmott’s book walks through the main types of credit derivatives, from simple default swaps to the multi-name products that helped blow up the global financial system in 2008.
Michael Lewis starts “Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt” with one of the best ironies I’ve seen in a finance book. After the 2008 financial crisis, after everything Goldman Sachs did, the only Goldman employee who got arrested was a guy who took something FROM Goldman. Not someone who helped crash the economy. A Russian programmer named Sergey Aleynikov who copied some code.
In Chapter 39 we valued default risk by modeling the firm’s assets, earnings, and cash. That is the “look inside the company” approach. Chapter 40 takes a completely different path. Instead of trying to understand why a company might default, just model default as a random external event. Roll a die. If you get a 1, the company defaults. Simple.
So I just finished re-reading Flash Boys by Michael Lewis, and honestly, it hits different every time. This book came out in 2014 and people are still arguing about it. That tells you something.
Welcome to Part Four of Wilmott’s book: Credit Risk. Up until now, every product we priced assumed that all cashflows are guaranteed. Coupons get paid. Bonds get redeemed. Nobody goes bankrupt. That was a comfortable world to live in, but it is not reality.
Theory is nice. But at some point you have to price actual products that real people are trading. Chapter 38 of Wilmott’s book takes two interesting fixed-income contracts and walks through how to price them from scratch. No hand waving. Just the math, the logic, and even the code.
In earlier chapters of Wilmott’s book, we modeled interest rates by picking one short-term rate and deriving the entire yield curve from it. Works fine for simple stuff. But Heath, Jarrow, and Morton said: why model just the short end when you can model the whole forward rate curve at once?
We have spent several chapters building interest rate models. Vasicek, CIR, Hull and White, Ho and Lee, Black-Derman-Toy. Each one chosen for its nice mathematical properties, clean closed-form solutions, and easy calibration. But here is the uncomfortable question Wilmott asks in Chapter 36: do any of these models actually match what interest rates do in the real world?
One-factor interest rate models have a fundamental problem. They assume that a single number, the spot interest rate, drives the entire yield curve. That means all rates of all maturities move together in lockstep. If the spot rate goes up by 1%, every other rate adjusts accordingly. The yield curve can shift up and down, but it cannot twist or tilt independently at different maturities.
Most people know what a mortgage is. You borrow money to buy a house, you make monthly payments, and after 20 or 30 years you own the house free and clear. But what happens to all those mortgages after the bank gives them out? They get bundled together and sold to investors. That is a mortgage-backed security. Chapter 34 of Wilmott’s book explains how these things work, why they are tricky to price, and what makes them different from every other fixed-income product.
Imagine a bond that can transform into stock. That is a convertible bond. Chapter 33 of Wilmott’s book dives into one of the most fascinating instruments in finance, a hybrid security that sometimes acts like debt and sometimes acts like equity. It sounds simple on the surface, but underneath it is a deeply complex contract involving American option features, stochastic interest rates, path dependence, dilution, and credit risk.
If you thought equity options were complex, welcome to the world of interest rate derivatives. Chapter 32 of Wilmott’s book takes everything we learned about modeling bonds and the yield curve and applies it to actual products that traders buy and sell every day. Caps, floors, swaptions, callable bonds, and a whole zoo of exotic contracts.
In the last chapter, we saw one-factor models for interest rates. You pick a model, choose some parameters, and out comes a theoretical yield curve. But here is the problem: that theoretical yield curve almost certainly does not match the actual yield curve you see in the market. And if your model gives wrong prices for plain vanilla bonds, how can you trust it to price anything more complex?
With Chapter 30, we enter Part Three of the book: fixed-income modeling and derivatives. Up to now, interest rates have been either constant or known functions of time. That is fine for short-dated equity options. But for longer-dated contracts, and especially for bonds and interest rate derivatives, we need to treat the interest rate itself as random. This changes everything.
Theory is nice, but at some point you have to look at real contracts. Chapter 29 of Wilmott’s book takes a collection of actual term sheets for equity and FX derivatives and walks through them one by one. The goal is practical: can you look at a piece of paper describing some exotic contract and figure out how to price and hedge it?
By this point in the book, Wilmott has been classifying exotic options into tidy categories. Asian options got their own chapter. Lookbacks got their own chapter. Barrier options got their own chapter. But the universe of exotic derivatives is large and growing, and eventually the classification exercise breaks down. Chapter 28 is where Wilmott gives up on neat categories and just throws a bunch of interesting exotics at us. It is a grab bag, and it is fun.
Most options we have seen so far give the holder a choice at one specific moment. With a European option, you decide at expiry. With an American option, you pick the best time to exercise. But what if the option let you actively trade during its entire life, and then insured you against losses? That is the idea behind the passport option, and Chapter 27 of Wilmott’s book uses it to introduce stochastic control.
Every trader has the same fantasy: buy at the absolute lowest price and sell at the absolute highest. You can buy a contract that pays you as if you did. That is the lookback option, Chapter 26.
Asian options are probably the most practical exotic derivatives. In crude oil markets, they are not even considered exotic. They are the vanilla. Chapter 25 applies the framework from Chapter 24 to options whose payoff depends on an average price.
Barrier options showed us weak path dependence. The contract cared about the path, but we still solved a two-variable problem. Chapter 24 takes the next step: strong path dependence. Cannot be hidden in boundary conditions. We need an extra variable.
Barrier options used to be exotic. Now they are one of the most heavily traded option types. Chapter 23 goes deep on them. Simple enough to understand, useful enough to be everywhere, tricky enough to mess up if you do not pay attention.
We have spent a lot of time on vanilla calls and puts. But now Wilmott opens Part Two of the book, and things get interesting. Chapter 22 introduces exotic derivatives, contracts that keep quants employed and traders nervous.
Chapter 21 is short and completely different from everything else in the book. No equations. No theorems. Instead, Wilmott describes a classroom trading game designed to teach option pricing through actual experience. The game was created by one of his former students, David Epstein, and it is surprisingly brilliant in its simplicity.
People have been trying to predict financial markets since markets existed. Chapter 20 of Wilmott’s book takes an honest, slightly skeptical tour through the methods traders use. The verdict? Mixed at best. And Wilmott is not shy about saying so.
Any smart investor, whether a billion-dollar bank or a retiree with a savings account, should know the answer to one question: how much could I lose? Chapter 19 introduces Value at Risk (VaR), the industry standard for answering exactly that.
Up until now in Wilmott’s book, we have been hedging everything. Buy a derivative, hedge with the underlying, pocket risk-free returns. Banks love it. But not everyone plays that game. Fund managers buy and sell assets trying to beat the bank rate. They take risk on purpose. Chapter 18 is about doing that intelligently.
Chapter 17 starts with a confession that always gets Wilmott in trouble with bank training managers. He wants to call his lecture “Investment Lessons from Blackjack and Gambling.” They want him to change the title because regulators might frown on it. Wilmott thinks this is silly. Investment and gambling share the same mathematical roots. And most professional gamblers he knows understand risk and money management better than most risk managers at banks.
Chapter 16 is a short but important one. It asks a question that every quant should think about deeply: is the normal distribution actually a good model for financial returns? The answer is “mostly yes, but catastrophically no.” And that “catastrophically no” part has wiped out entire firms.
In Part 1 we covered the intuition behind the binomial model: delta hedging, risk-neutral pricing, and why probabilities do not matter for option values. Now we get to the practical side. How do you actually build a binomial tree, compute option prices, estimate Greeks, handle American options, and connect everything back to Black-Scholes?
Chapter 15 of Wilmott’s book introduces the binomial model, and honestly it might be the single most important chapter for building intuition about how option pricing actually works. Forget stochastic calculus for a moment. This model uses nothing more than basic arithmetic, and yet it arrives at exactly the same answers as Black-Scholes.
Swaps are one of the biggest markets in finance. The total notional principal is comfortably in the hundreds of trillions of dollars. Chapter 14 of Wilmott’s book explains how they work, why they exist, and how they connect to the bond pricing we covered in the previous post.
We are leaving the world of options for a bit and entering the world of fixed income. This is the world of bonds, interest rates, and cashflows. Chapter 13 of Wilmott’s book is a self-contained introduction that does not require anything from earlier chapters. If you have ever wondered what a yield curve is or why bond traders care about something called “duration,” this is the post for you.
This chapter is one of the most practically important in the entire book. Wilmott starts with a bold statement: there is money to be made from options because they may be mispriced by the market. He knows the efficient market crowd hates this idea. But volatility arbitrage hedge funds clearly believe it, so let us look at the math.
So far in this series we have been looking at options on a single stock. One underlying, one random walk, one volatility. Life was simple. But the real world is messier. Many popular contracts depend on two, five, or even twenty different assets at the same time. Welcome to the world of multi-asset options.
Most of derivative pricing theory goes out of its way to avoid thinking about probability. The whole point of hedging and no-arbitrage is to eliminate uncertainty. You do not need to know where the stock is going; you just need to build a portfolio that does not care. But Chapter 10 of Wilmott’s book asks us to step back and look at the randomness underneath. Where might the stock actually end up? How long before it hits a certain level? These questions matter for American options, for speculation, and for understanding what the math is really doing.
European options are simple: you wait until expiry, check if they are in the money, and either collect the payoff or walk away. American options give you more power and more headaches. You can exercise at any time before expiry, which sounds great but raises a hard question: when exactly should you do it? Chapter 9 of Wilmott’s book tackles this problem, and the ideas that come out of it show up again and again throughout the rest of quantitative finance.
The vanilla Black-Scholes model assumes a clean world: no dividends, constant parameters, one type of underlying. Real markets are messier. Chapter 8 of Wilmott’s book starts adding realism. Dividends, currencies, commodities, stock borrowing costs, time-dependent parameters. Each generalization is surprisingly straightforward once you understand the basic framework, which is the good news. The bad news is that you need to keep track of which adjustments apply to your specific situation.
Chapter 7 is one of the meatiest chapters in the first part of Wilmott’s book. It does two big things: first, it derives the actual Black-Scholes formulas for calls, puts, and binary options step by step. Second, it introduces the Greeks, which are the sensitivity measures that traders live and die by every single day. Wilmott makes an interesting argument early on: getting the hedging right is more important than getting the price right. Let me explain why.
If you have ever cooked something on a metal pan, you already understand partial differential equations. No, seriously. The way heat flows from the burner through the pan to your food follows the exact same type of math that prices options on Wall Street. Chapter 6 of Wilmott’s book makes this connection explicit, and honestly it makes the whole thing feel a lot less scary.
Wilmott calls Chapter 5 “without doubt, the most important chapter in the book.” He is not exaggerating. Everything before this was setup. Everything after this builds on what happens here. The Black-Scholes equation was first written down in 1969, the derivation was published in 1973, and finance has never been the same since.
Chapter 4 is the toolbox chapter. Before we can price options, we need the mathematical machinery to handle random variables properly. The centerpiece is Ito’s lemma, the rule that replaces ordinary calculus when things are random. Wilmott goes out of his way to make this accessible, and honestly, it is not as scary as it sounds.
Chapter 3 is where the real modeling begins. Wilmott takes us from “stock prices look random” to “here is the specific mathematical model for that randomness.” By the end of this chapter, we have the fundamental equation that drives almost everything in quantitative finance.
Chapter 2 is where Wilmott introduces the main character of the book: options. Also known as derivatives or contingent claims. No heavy math here yet, just definitions, jargon, and some clever strategies people use to make (or lose) money.
Chapter 1 of Wilmott’s book starts gently. No scary equations yet. Just the basic building blocks of finance that everything else in the book rests on. If you have worked in finance for a while, you know most of this already. But if you are coming from math or engineering background, this is the foundation you need.
I’m about to do something a bit ambitious. I’m going to retell the entire “Paul Wilmott on Quantitative Finance” - one of the biggest, most comprehensive textbooks on quantitative finance ever written. And I’m going to do it in plain English.
We made it. Fifteen posts, twelve chapters, and one very thorough book about hedge fund compliance. If you stuck with this series from beginning to end, thank you. That was a long ride.
This is the last real chapter. Scharfman wraps up the book by looking ahead. What trends are shaping hedge fund compliance going forward? What should people in the industry worry about?
This is Part 2 of Chapter 11. If you missed Part 1 about compliance consulting, start there. This half covers the interview with Vinod Paul from Eze Castle Integration. The focus here is cybersecurity, cloud computing, data protection, and disaster recovery for hedge funds.
Chapter 11 is different from everything before it. Instead of explaining rules and frameworks, Scharfman sits down with real people who do compliance work every day. He interviews two compliance service providers and lets them talk about what they actually see in the field.
Chapter 10 of Scharfman’s book is one of the most practical chapters so far. Instead of explaining rules or regulations, it focuses on six real mistakes hedge funds make with their compliance programs. Let me walk you through all six.
Chapter 9 is where Scharfman stops talking theory and starts showing what compliance looks like in practice. He gives us two hypothetical scenarios (basically role-play conversations) and two real SEC enforcement cases. Each one teaches a lesson about what can go wrong when compliance is treated as an afterthought.
Up until now in this series, we talked about compliance from the hedge fund’s point of view. How they build programs, hire people, write policies. Chapter 8 flips the script. Now we look at it from the investor side. How do investors figure out if a fund’s compliance is actually good?
Previous chapters talked about the people and systems behind hedge fund compliance. Chapter 7 shifts focus to paperwork. And yes, I know paperwork sounds boring. But here’s the thing: without proper documentation, a hedge fund’s compliance program basically does not exist. At least not in the eyes of regulators.
So far in this series we talked about in-house compliance. The people inside a hedge fund who make sure rules are followed. But here’s the thing. Sometimes that’s not enough. Sometimes you need to call in outside help.
Technology runs everything these days. Hedge funds are no different. Chapter 5 of Scharfman’s book looks at how hedge funds use technology specifically for compliance. Not for trading. Not for making money. For following the rules and keeping records.
In the last chapter we talked about the Chief Compliance Officer. The person in charge. But here’s the thing. One person can’t do everything. Even the best CCO needs a team. Chapter 4 is about how that team gets built and how the whole thing works together.
Every hedge fund needs someone who keeps things legal. That person is the Chief Compliance Officer, or CCO. Chapter 3 of Jason Scharfman’s book breaks down what a CCO actually does, what qualifications they need, and how the whole regulatory reporting process works.
Chapter 2 of Scharfman’s book is all about regulation. Who makes the rules for hedge funds? Who enforces them? And what happens when the regulators actually show up at your door? Let’s break it down.
Let’s start with the basics. What does “compliance” even mean? In simple words, compliance is how an organization follows the rules. Every industry has rules. Healthcare, construction, science, finance. The government usually writes these rules, but sometimes they come from other places too.
So I just finished reading “Hedge Fund Compliance: Risks, Regulation, and Management” by Jason A. Scharfman, and I wanted to share what I learned. This book is dense. Like, really dense. But the stuff inside is important if you want to understand how hedge funds actually follow the rules (or don’t).
That is it. Twenty-nine chapters, seven parts, and around forty posts later, we are done with “Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners” by Larry Harris (ISBN: 0-19-514470-8, Oxford University Press, 2003).
This is the last chapter of the book, and Harris saved a spicy one for the end. Chapter 29 is about insider trading. You might think it is simple: insiders trade on secret info, SEC catches them, they go to jail. But Harris shows that the whole topic is way more complicated than that. There are actually serious economists who argue insider trading should be legal. Let me explain.
In Part 1 we looked at how bubbles form and crashes happen. Now the obvious follow-up: can we actually prevent this stuff? Or at least make it less painful? Harris walks through the tools markets use to deal with extreme volatility, and the picture is more complicated than you would expect.
This is the most dramatic chapter in the entire book. Bubbles inflate, crashes wipe out fortunes, and panic replaces logic. If you ever watched a stock chart go vertical and wondered “how does this end?”, Harris answers that question here. Spoiler: badly for whoever is holding the bag last.
Chapter 27 is a fascinating time capsule. Harris wrote this around 2003, when the debate between floor trading and electronic trading was still alive. The NYSE was building a new trading floor. The Chicago exchanges were still mostly pit-based. Reading it now, knowing how completely electronic trading won, is like reading someone in 1995 carefully weighing the pros and cons of email versus fax machines.
Should all trading in a stock happen in one place, or is it okay to have dozens of venues competing for your order? Chapter 26 is about exactly this tension, and honestly, it is one of the most relevant chapters in the whole book if you want to understand why modern markets look the way they do.
If you use Robinhood or any zero-commission broker, this chapter explains how the sausage is made. You pay zero commission, sure. But someone is paying your broker for the privilege of filling your order. That someone is a wholesale dealer, and the payment is called “payment for order flow.” Chapter 25 breaks down how this works and whether it hurts you.
The New York Stock Exchange used to have these people called specialists. Each one was assigned a handful of stocks and was basically the boss of all trading in those stocks. They stood at a physical post on the floor, saw every order coming in, ran the opening auction, and traded with their own money when nobody else would. One of the most privileged positions in finance. And one of the most controversial.
If you have money in a Vanguard or Fidelity index fund, or you buy SPY or VOO through your brokerage app, Chapter 23 is basically about you. Harris wrote this in 2003, but it reads like a prediction of what actually happened. Index investing went from a niche idea to the default way normal people invest. This chapter explains why.
This is the part of the book where Harris basically tells you that almost everything you think you know about picking winning traders is wrong. If Part 1 was about how hard it is to evaluate past performance, Part 2 is about why predicting future performance is nearly hopeless. And honestly, it is one of the most important chapters in the entire book.
Chapter 22 should be required reading before anyone picks a mutual fund, hires a money manager, or brags about stock returns at a dinner party. Harris basically proves, with math, that telling skill from luck in investing is almost impossible.
You know how every finance influencer tells you “minimize your trading costs”? Cool advice. But nobody tells you how to actually measure those costs. That is what chapter 21 is about. It turns out measuring transaction costs is surprisingly hard, and every method has problems.
Chapter 20 is one of the shorter chapters in the book, but it covers something every trader thinks about constantly: volatility. Why do prices move? Why do they sometimes move way more than the actual news justifies? Harris breaks it down into two types and explains why the distinction matters more than most people realize.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
This is the final post in my series covering Financial Markets and Institutions by Jeff Madura. Over the previous posts, I worked through all 25 chapters and 7 parts of the book. Here is what it all adds up to.
Everyone in finance talks about liquidity. Traders want it, exchanges advertise it, regulators worry when it disappears. Yet if you ask five people what liquidity actually means, you will get five different answers. Chapter 19 is where Harris finally pins it down. His definition is simple: liquidity is the ability to trade large size quickly, at low cost, when you want to trade. That is it. But the simplicity hides a lot of complexity.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
Chapter 25 is the longest chapter in Part 7 and covers two major categories of financial institutions: insurance companies and pension funds. Both are massive investors that channel money from individuals into financial markets. Insurance companies alone hold trillions in assets. Pension funds are some of the largest institutional investors in the world.
If you are a big institutional trader at a mutual fund or pension fund, your daily problem is not “what to buy.” The portfolio manager already decided that. Your problem is how to buy it without the whole market figuring out what you are doing and trading against you.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
Chapter 24 is about securities firms, and it covers a lot of ground. These are the companies that sit at the center of capital markets, helping governments and corporations raise money, facilitating trades between investors, and sometimes trading for their own profit. Some are independent. Many are part of larger financial conglomerates. After the credit crisis, some became part of bank holding companies. But their securities operations remain distinct from traditional banking.
In Part 1 we covered what arbitrage is, the different types (pure vs speculative), and how arbitrageurs keep prices consistent across markets. Sounds like easy money, right? Buy low here, sell high there, pocket the difference. This part is about why it is not that simple. Harris lays out four specific risks that make arbitrage genuinely dangerous, and he has some incredible real-world examples to prove it.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
Chapter 23 covers mutual funds, and it is packed. This is one of the longer chapters because mutual funds are such a big part of the financial system. There are more than 7,500 different mutual funds in the US with total assets of about $12 trillion. If you have a retirement account, you are almost certainly invested in one.
Chapter 17 is about arbitrageurs, and it is one of those chapters that changes how you think about markets. Arbitrageurs are the people who keep prices consistent across different markets and different instruments. Without them, you could have oil priced at 80 dollars in New York and 70 dollars in London, and nobody would fix it.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
Chapter 22 is one of the shorter chapters in the book, but it covers an important piece of the financial system that most people do not think about. Finance companies provide short and intermediate-term credit to consumers and small businesses. They are not banks. They do not take deposits. But they move a lot of money.
Chapter 16 is basically the Warren Buffett chapter. Not that Harris mentions Buffett by name, but the whole idea of value trading is: figure out what something is really worth, wait for the market to misprice it, buy low, sell high. That is the entire philosophy in one sentence. The hard part is everything else.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
Chapter 21 takes us into the world of thrift institutions. These are the savings banks, savings and loan associations (S&Ls), and credit unions that most of us interact with without thinking twice. They are different from commercial banks in important ways, and this chapter explains exactly how.
Say you manage a pension fund and you need to sell 500,000 shares of some stock. You cannot just drop a market order on the exchange. The order book does not have that much liquidity sitting around. If you try to force it through, you will eat through every level of the book and crash the price on yourself. Chapter 15 is about how these giant trades actually get done.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
Chapter 20 wraps up the commercial banking section by asking a simple question: how do you know if a bank is doing well? Regulators need to spot problems early. Shareholders need to know if their investment is paying off. And bank managers need feedback on whether their strategies are working.
In Part 1 we covered dealer spreads, the two spread components (transaction costs and adverse selection), and why uninformed traders lose no matter what order type they use. Now Harris finishes the chapter with equally important stuff: what determines equilibrium spreads in real markets, how public traders compete with dealers, and what factors predict whether a given instrument will have wide or narrow spreads.
That is 29 chapters. Seven major parts. Hundreds of concepts. One very thorough book about how financial markets actually work beneath the surface.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
Chapter 19 is where the rubber meets the road. You know what banks are (Chapter 17) and how they are regulated (Chapter 18). Now the question is: how do bank managers actually run these things day to day? The answer involves juggling several types of risk at once while trying to maximize shareholder value.
Most people think insider trading is straightforwardly evil. Rich executives cheating the system by trading on secret information. Easy call, right?
Harris calls chapter 14 the most important chapter in the book. Bold claim for page 297, but he backs it up. The lesson is simple and painful: uninformed traders lose money no matter what they do. Not because they pick the wrong side. Because they trade at all.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
Chapter 18 is all about the rules banks have to follow. The short version: banks hold other people’s money, so governments regulate them to prevent disasters. The longer version involves a complex web of federal and state agencies, capital requirements, and lessons learned from every financial crisis.
Previous: Floor vs Automated Trading
Chapter 28 is the most dramatic chapter in Trading and Exchanges. It covers the moments when markets go completely sideways. Bubbles that inflate until they pop. Crashes that destroy enormous wealth in hours. And the regulatory responses that try to prevent it all from happening again.
Dealers are merchants. They buy low, sell high, pocket the difference. If you ever bought a used phone from a resale shop, you understand the concept. The shop bought it for less, sells it to you for more. Financial market dealers do the same thing with stocks, bonds, and currencies.
So we made it. 17 posts later, and we’ve covered the entire “Behavioral Finance for Private Banking” by Thorsten Hens, Enrico G. De Giorgi, and Kremena K. Bachmann. That was a lot of ground.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
Chapter 17 shifts the book from financial markets to financial institutions. And it starts with the biggest ones: commercial banks. By total assets, they are the most important type of financial intermediary in the economy. Their core job is simple. Take money from people who have it (surplus units) and move it to people who need it (deficit units). But the way they do it is worth understanding.
So we made it through all 15 chapters of Behavioral Finance and Investor Types by Michael M. Pompian. Here’s what I think about the whole thing.
Previous: Competition Among Markets
In 1999, the Bangladeshi Stock Exchange replaced its trading floor with an automated system. At the same time, the New York Stock Exchange was considering where to build a new trading floor.
This is the chapter where Harris explains how scammers work the stock market. Chapter 12 is about bluffers: traders who trick other people into bad trades so they can profit. If you ever wondered how pump and dump schemes actually function at a mechanical level, this is it.
This is a retelling of Chapter 14 (Conclusions) from “Behavioral Finance for Private Banking” by Thorsten Hens, Enrico G. De Giorgi, and Kremena K. Bachmann (Wiley, 2018).
Previous: Internalization and Crossing
You might think there is one stock market. There is not. There are many. And they are all fighting each other for your orders.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
Chapter 16 is where things get global. If you have ever traveled abroad and exchanged dollars for euros or pesos, you already know the basics of the foreign exchange market. But there is a whole world of derivative instruments built on top of currency exchange rates. And they move serious money. Foreign exchange derivatives account for about half of all daily forex transaction volume.
This is it. Chapter 15 of Behavioral Finance and Investor Types by Michael M. Pompian is where everything comes together. All those chapters about biases, personality types, asset classes, and financial planning? They were building up to this. The final chapter answers the obvious question: okay, I know my investor type, now what do I actually do with my portfolio?
Chapter 11 is about the shady side of trading. Harris introduces order anticipators: people who profit not by knowing what a stock is worth, but by figuring out what other traders are about to do and trading before them. They are parasites. Harris uses that word deliberately. No better prices. No liquidity. They just extract money from other people’s trades.
Theory is nice. But does behavioral finance actually work when real people sit across from real bankers with real money on the table?
Not every trade happens on an exchange. A lot of trading happens away from organized markets, and how it happens raises some genuinely difficult questions about whether investors are getting a fair deal.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 Series: Chapter 15 Review
A swap is an agreement between two parties to exchange a set of payments over time. The most common type swaps fixed interest rate payments for floating ones. Chapter 15 covers the different types of swaps, how they are priced, what risks they carry, and how the swap market nearly brought down the financial system.
In Part 1 we covered the four types of informed traders: value traders, news traders, technical traders, and arbitrageurs. Now we get to the really good stuff. What happens when all these informed traders compete? How efficient do prices actually get? And why can markets never be perfectly efficient?
Chapter 14 of Behavioral Finance and Investor Types by Michael M. Pompian takes a step back from psychology and biases. Instead it asks a very basic question: do you actually have a plan? Not an investment strategy. Not a stock pick. A plan. Because financial planning and investing are not the same thing, and a lot of people confuse the two.
This is a retelling of Chapter 12 (Fintech) from “Behavioral Finance for Private Banking” by Thorsten Hens, Enrico G. De Giorgi, and Kremena K. Bachmann (Wiley, 2018).
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 Series: Chapter 14 Review
Options give you the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell something at a specific price by a specific date. That “not the obligation” part is what makes them different from futures. Chapter 14 covers call options, put options, what drives their prices, and how they are used to speculate and hedge.
The specialist system is one of those things that sounds simple on paper but gets really complicated in practice. And controversial. Very controversial.
Chapter 10 is where Harris gets into one of the most important ideas in the entire book: how certain traders actually make prices accurate. Not because they want to help society. They just want to make money. The price accuracy is a side effect.
Chapter 13 of Behavioral Finance and Investor Types by Michael M. Pompian is about the single most important investment decision you will ever make. Not which stocks to buy. Not when to buy them. It is about how you split your money across different types of investments. That is asset allocation.
Part 1 covered stocks and the basics of asset classes. Now in the second half of Chapter 12 of Behavioral Finance and Investor Types, Michael Pompian walks through the rest of the investment universe: bonds, hedge funds, real assets, and finally how to put them all together into a portfolio.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 Series: Chapter 13 Review
Futures contracts are basically agreements to buy or sell something at a specific price on a specific date in the future. Chapter 13 focuses on financial futures, which cover Treasury bills, Treasury bonds, stock indexes, and individual stocks. Two types of people use them: hedgers who want to reduce risk, and speculators who want to bet on price movements.
Index trading is one of the most important financial innovations of the twentieth century. And after reading Chapter 22 about how hard it is to identify skilled managers, you can understand why.
Here’s a question most people never think about. When you walk into a private bank and sit down with an advisor, what exactly is the process? Is there even a process? Or does the advisor just pick investments based on their own favorites and hope for the best?
Chapter 9 is one of those chapters you might be tempted to skip because it sounds theoretical. “Good Markets.” Sounds like an econ textbook subtitle. But Harris actually makes a case here that affects literally everyone, not just traders.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 Series: Chapter 12 Review
Most people think buying a stock is simple. You click a button and it happens. Chapter 12 pulls back the curtain on what actually goes on between that click and the execution. It covers order types, margin trading, short selling, the role of market makers, electronic trading, and the regulations that try to keep everything fair.
In Part 1, we saw that statistical tests need 20+ years of data to reliably separate skilled managers from lucky ones. But the problems run even deeper. This section of Chapter 22 covers the traps that make performance evaluation even less reliable than the basic statistics suggest, and what actually works for predicting who will trade well.
Chapter 10 of “Behavioral Finance for Private Banking” is where everything from the earlier chapters comes together. All the biases, prospect theory, loss aversion, mental accounting, it all converges here. Into one practical question: how do you figure out how much risk a client can actually handle?
Up to this point in Behavioral Finance and Investor Types, Michael Pompian has been talking about psychology, biases, and investor personalities. Chapter 12 switches gears. Now he lays out what you can actually invest in. Because knowing your own biases is great, but at some point you need to understand the tools on the table.
In Part 1 we covered the “normal” reasons people trade: investing, borrowing, exchanging assets, hedging. Those are utilitarian traders who use markets to solve real-world problems. Now we get to the uncomfortable half. Gamblers, speculators, fools, and everyone in between.
You’ve probably heard the standard advice. When you’re young, put your money in stocks. As you get older, shift to bonds. Simple. Clean. Fits on a napkin.
Here’s a question that keeps coming up in investing: how do you know if a fund manager is actually good, or just lucky?
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 Series: Chapter 11 Review
How much is a stock actually worth? That is the central question of Chapter 11. And the honest answer is: it depends on who you ask and what model they use. Madura walks through the main valuation methods, explains how risk gets measured, and then tackles whether markets are even efficient enough for any of this to matter.
If the Preserver is the cautious tortoise and the Follower goes with the crowd, the Accumulator is the person at the poker table who shoves all in and stares you down while doing it. Chapter 11 of Behavioral Finance and Investor Types by Michael M. Pompian introduces the most aggressive of the four behavioral investor types.
Chapter 8 opens Part II of the book, and it asks one of those questions that sounds obvious until you actually try to answer it: why do people trade?
So you picked your ideal portfolio. Good stocks, some bonds, maybe real estate. Everything is balanced perfectly. Now what? Do you just sit there and never touch it again?
And that’s a wrap on “Hedge Fund Analysis” by Frank J. Travers.
Over the past 20 posts, we went through the entire book, from the history of hedge funds all the way to the final scoring model. Here’s what I think you should take away from all of this.
You cannot manage what you cannot measure. Harris opens Chapter 21 with this principle and then spends the rest of the chapter explaining just how hard it is to measure transaction costs properly. The basic idea is simple: compare what you paid to some benchmark price. But the choice of benchmark determines everything, and every benchmark has flaws.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
Chapter 10 moves from debt markets to equity markets. This is about how companies sell ownership to the public, how stock exchanges work, and how investors try to keep corporate managers honest. If the previous chapters were about lending money, this one is about buying a piece of a company.
Chapter 10 of Behavioral Finance and Investor Types by Michael M. Pompian introduces the Independent. If the Follower from the last chapter was the passenger, the Independent is the person who insists on driving. And reading the map. And ignoring the GPS because they “know a shortcut.”
In Part 1 we covered what brokers do, different broker types, and how they make money. Now we get to the uncomfortable part: what happens when your broker does not have your best interests in mind.
Chapter 12 is the final chapter and it is where everything comes together. After all the sourcing, screening, interviewing, number crunching, operational checks, risk reviews, and reference calls, Travers shows us how to take all that work and turn it into a single, structured decision.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
Chapter 9 is the one where everything comes together. Madura covers how mortgage markets work, the different types of mortgages, how they get packaged into securities, and how the whole system collapsed in 2008. If you want to understand the credit crisis, this is the chapter to read.
Chapter 7 of “Behavioral Finance for Private Banking” is about structured products. If you’ve never heard of them, don’t worry. Most people haven’t. But by the end of 2007, there were more than 340 billion Swiss francs invested in them in Switzerland alone. That’s 6.5% of all assets under management. Over 20,000 different structured products listed on the Swiss stock exchange.
Chapter 9 of Behavioral Finance and Investor Types by Michael M. Pompian introduces the Follower. And honestly, this one probably describes more people than any other type in the book.
You open Robinhood, tap “Buy,” and 0.3 seconds later you own shares of Apple. Simple, right? But between your thumb tap and that trade actually happening, there is a whole chain of people and systems doing work for you. Chapter 7 is about those people. Brokers.
Volatility is one of those words that everyone uses but most people think about too simply. Prices went up and down a lot today? Volatile. VIX is high? Volatile. Your crypto portfolio lost 40%? Very volatile.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
Chapter 8 is where Madura gets into the math behind bond prices. If Chapter 7 was about the types of bonds, this chapter explains how to figure out what they are worth, why their prices change, and how investors manage the risk. It is the most technical chapter so far, but the concepts are fundamental to understanding how fixed-income investing works.
Chapter 11 opens with a Reagan quote, “Trust but verify.” That pretty much sets the tone. You have spent hundreds of hours doing investment, operational, and risk due diligence on a hedge fund. But have you actually checked whether the people running it are who they say they are?
Everyone talks about liquidity. Traders talk about it. Regulators talk about it. Financial journalists definitely talk about it. But Harris makes a sharp observation right at the start of Chapter 19: rarely does anyone define what they actually mean. People use the same word to describe different things, and then they wonder why they cannot agree on anything.
This is a retelling of Chapter 6, Part 2 (sections 6.7-6.9) from “Behavioral Finance for Private Banking” by Thorsten Hens, Enrico G. De Giorgi, and Kremena K. Bachmann (Wiley, 2018).
Chapter 8 of Behavioral Finance and Investor Types by Michael M. Pompian introduces the first of the Behavioral Investor Types: the Preserver. And honestly, if you’ve ever been too scared to invest your savings because “what if the market crashes tomorrow,” this chapter is about you.
Chapter 6 is where Harris explains the actual machinery that matches buyers with sellers. If you ever wondered what happens between the moment you hit “buy” and the moment your order fills, this is the chapter.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
Chapter 7 shifts from money markets (short-term) to bond markets (long-term). Bonds are how governments and corporations borrow money for years or even decades. This chapter covers the different types of bonds, how they work, and how the bond market has gone global.
If you are a retail trader, you tap “buy” on your phone and your order fills in milliseconds. Easy. But if you manage a pension fund and need to buy 500,000 shares of something? That is an entirely different problem. Chapter 18 is about the people who solve it.
This is a retelling of Chapter 6 Part 1 (sections 6.1 through 6.6) from “Behavioral Finance for Private Banking” by Thorsten Hens, Enrico G. De Giorgi, and Kremena K. Bachmann (Wiley, 2018).
Chapter 7 of Behavioral Finance and Investor Types by Michael M. Pompian is where theory finally meets practice. After six chapters of background, frameworks, and definitions, you actually get to take the quizzes and figure out what type of investor you are. Two quizzes, to be specific.
Chapter 10 opens with a Warren Buffett quote: “Risk comes from not knowing what you’re doing.” Hard to argue with that. Travers uses this chapter to walk us through the risk due diligence process, and honestly, some of the findings are pretty eye-opening.
In Part 1 we covered trading sessions and the main execution systems: quote-driven dealer markets and order-driven markets. Now let’s get into brokered markets, hybrid structures, crossing networks, and the information plumbing that holds everything together.
Last time we covered what arbitrageurs are and why they matter. But here is the thing: knowing that arbitrage exists is very different from understanding how hard it actually is to pull off. This second half of Chapter 17 gets into the specific strategies, the risks, and the spectacular ways arbitrage can go wrong.
In Part 1 we covered the big picture of operational due diligence and why so many hedge fund failures trace back to operational problems. Now in Part 2, Travers lays out exactly what to check, what questions to ask, and then shows us a real example interview with the operations team at Fictional Capital Management (FCM).
This is a retelling of Chapter 5 (Diagnostic Tests for Investment Personality) from “Behavioral Finance for Private Banking” by Thorsten Hens, Enrico G. De Giorgi, and Kremena K. Bachmann (Wiley, 2018).
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
This is Chapter 6 of Madura’s textbook, and it covers money markets. These are the markets where short-term debt gets traded. We are talking about securities that mature in one year or less. They might not be exciting, but they keep the financial system running.
Chapter 6 of Behavioral Finance and Investor Types by Michael M. Pompian is where it all comes together. After two chapters on personality theory and personality testing, Pompian finally introduces the thing the whole book is building toward: his Behavioral Investor Type (BIT) framework.
Chapter 5 is where Harris gets into the actual plumbing. You know how in previous chapters we talked about types of traders and types of orders? Now we are looking at the arena where all that happens. Market structure. The rules, the systems, and the “who gets to trade with whom” part.
Chapter 4 covered the history of personality theory. Now in Chapter 5 of Behavioral Finance and Investor Types, Michael Pompian moves to the practical side: how do you actually test for personality? Because having a theory is nice, but you need a way to measure it. And that’s what this chapter is about.
Book: Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners Author: Larry Harris Publisher: Oxford University Press, 2003 ISBN: 0-19-514470-8
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
Chapter 4 explained how the Fed is set up and what tools it uses. Chapter 5 goes deeper into how those tools actually affect the economy. This is where it all comes together: money supply changes flow through to interest rates, which affect borrowing, which affects spending, which affects jobs and prices.
Chapter 9 is where Travers shifts from talking about investment analysis to something most people overlook: the boring operational stuff that actually prevents you from losing all your money to fraud.
Chapter 4 of “Behavioral Finance for Private Banking” is short but it hits hard. It asks one simple question: what is actually happening inside your brain when you make money decisions?
So I just finished walking through all nine chapters of Richard Wilson’s “The Hedge Fund Book.” And here’s what I think after going through the whole thing.
Every time you tap “buy” in your brokerage app, you are sending an order. But most people have no idea there are many different kinds of orders, and each one has very different consequences for your wallet. Chapter 4 is basically a field guide to all of them.
Traditional finance has this idea that money is the great equalizer. Doesn’t matter if you’re from Japan or Nigeria or Norway. We all want the same thing: good returns, low risk. Press a few buttons, buy some stocks, done.
In Part 1 we covered the basics and operations side of hedge fund FAQs. Now we get to the stuff that actually makes or breaks a fund in the real world: finding money and building a career. Richard Wilson collects the most common questions he gets about marketing, sales, and working in the industry. Let me walk you through what he says.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
The Federal Reserve is the most powerful financial institution in the United States. Chapter 4 explains how it is organized, how it controls the money supply, and what it did during the 2008 credit crisis. If you want to understand why interest rates change, you need to understand the Fed.
In Part 1 we covered the theory behind onsite interviews. Now Travers takes us inside the actual visit to Fictional Capital Management. This is where we get to see how all those interview techniques play out in a real (well, fictional but realistic) setting.
Chapter 4 of Behavioral Finance and Investor Types by Michael M. Pompian takes a step back from finance entirely. Instead, it walks through the history of personality theory. Why? Because before you can classify investor types, you need to understand how psychologists figured out personality types in the first place.
In Part 1 we covered the players: buy side, sell side, brokers, dealers. Now Harris walks us through what they actually trade, where they trade it, and who makes sure nobody burns the whole thing down.
Book: Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners Author: Larry Harris Publisher: Oxford University Press, 2003 ISBN: 0-19-514470-8
This is a retelling of Chapter 2 (second half) from “Behavioral Finance for Private Banking” by Thorsten Hens, Enrico G. De Giorgi, and Kremena K. Bachmann (Wiley, 2018).
Book: Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners Author: Larry Harris Publisher: Oxford University Press, 2003 ISBN: 0-19-514470-8
So we made it. Eighteen posts later, we’ve walked through the entire book. Let me try to pull it all together and tell you what I think.
Chapter 9 of “The Hedge Fund Book” by Richard C. Wilson is basically one giant FAQ section. Wilson says his company gets over 150,000 emails a year, and a huge chunk of them ask the same questions over and over. So he put together the most common ones with answers. Smart move.
You have done the phone calls, crunched the numbers, analyzed the portfolio. Now it is time to actually show up at the hedge fund’s office and talk to people face to face.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
Chapter 2 explained why the general level of interest rates changes. Chapter 3 answers a different question: why do different securities pay different yields at the same point in time? A Treasury bond and a corporate bond with the same maturity do not offer the same return. This chapter explains why.
Chapter 3 of Behavioral Finance and Investor Types by Michael M. Pompian is where the real meat starts. This is the catalog of all the ways your brain sabotages your investing. Pompian calls them “the building blocks” and splits them into two big groups: cognitive biases and emotional biases.
Chapter 3 is a guided tour of the entire trading industry. Harris warns upfront it’s packed with jargon. He also says you can skip it if you already know this stuff. But if you’re new to how markets work, this chapter is the map you need before going deeper.
Chapter 2 of “Behavioral Finance for Private Banking” is where the book gets really practical. This is where Hens, De Giorgi, and Bachmann lay out the specific mental traps that mess up our investment decisions. And there are a lot of them.
Book: Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners Author: Larry Harris Publisher: Oxford University Press, 2003 ISBN: 0-19-514470-8
The investment industry loves a good buzzword. And for the last several years, “big data” and “machine learning” have been the ones getting all the attention. Fund managers talk about them in the same breath, like they’re the same thing. They’re not. And the authors make that distinction very clear in this final chapter.
In Part 1 we looked at how to get portfolio data from 13F filings and started breaking down Fictional Capital Management’s long book. Now we continue with more portfolio metrics and, more importantly, the liquidity analysis that catches the fund manager in a contradiction.
So we made it through the whole book. Seventeen posts later, here’s where I stand on “Introduction to Private Equity, Debt, and Real Assets” by Cyril Demaria (3rd edition, Wiley, ISBN 978-1-119-53737-3).
Chapter 8 of “The Hedge Fund Book” by Richard C. Wilson is about governance. If that word already made your eyes glaze over, stick with me. This is actually one of the more important chapters, because it explains why hedge funds blow up and how simple oversight structures can prevent it.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
Chapter 2 answers a question that affects everyone: why do interest rates go up and down? The answer comes down to supply and demand for money, explained through what economists call the loanable funds theory.
Before getting into theory, Harris tells stories. Chapter 2 walks you through real trading scenarios, from a regular person buying stock to a soybean processor hedging in the futures pit. Each story shows a different corner of the market.
Chapter 2 of Behavioral Finance and Investor Types by Michael M. Pompian opens with a quote I really like. Meir Statman from Santa Clara University said: “People in standard finance are rational. People in behavioral finance are normal.” That pretty much sums up the whole chapter.
After eight chapters of theory, Demaria drops a real case study on us. Not a made-up example. An actual deal. Advent International investing in Kroton Educacional SA, a Brazilian education company. This is where all the concepts from the book come alive.
Book: Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners Author: Larry Harris Publisher: Oxford University Press, 2003 ISBN: 0-19-514470-8
So you’ve learned how to trade EM credit, local rates, and FX. Now what? How do you actually put it all together into a portfolio? Chapter 10 is about the nuts and bolts of portfolio construction, and it has some genuinely surprising findings about indexes, risk parity, and why ESG is unfair to poor countries.
Chapter 7 of “The Hedge Fund Book” by Richard C. Wilson gets into the big leagues. We’re talking about hedge funds managing $1 billion or more. What do they do differently? Why do they keep getting bigger while most small funds stay small? Wilson lays out ten best practices from giant funds and brings in two interviews to back it up.
Chapter 7 opens with two quotes. One from Bernard Madoff saying he can’t discuss his proprietary strategy, and one from George Soros about how it’s not about being right or wrong, but how much you make when right and how much you lose when wrong. That contrast alone tells you everything about why portfolio analysis matters.
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
This is Part 1 of a chapter-by-chapter review of Financial Markets and Institutions by Jeff Madura. Chapter 1 sets the stage for the entire book by explaining what financial markets are, what gets traded in them, and why financial institutions exist.
Chapter 1 is where Harris lays out what this whole book is about. And honestly, even this intro chapter packs more useful information than most entire YouTube courses on “how to trade.”
This is a retelling of Chapter 1 (Introduction) from “Behavioral Finance for Private Banking” by Thorsten Hens, Enrico G. De Giorgi, and Kremena K. Bachmann (Wiley, 2018).
Chapter 1 of Behavioral Finance and Investor Types by Michael M. Pompian opens with a Picasso quote: “I’d like to live as a poor man, with lots of money.” That pretty much sets the tone. We all want financial success, but something keeps getting in the way. And that something is usually us.
So I just finished reading this book called Behavioral Finance and Investor Types by Michael M. Pompian. And honestly? It messed with my head a little. In a good way.
So I just finished reading “Behavioral Finance for Private Banking” by Thorsten Hens, Enrico G. De Giorgi, and Kremena K. Bachmann. Second edition, published by Wiley in 2018. ISBN: 9781119453703.
If Chapter 11 was about the parasites who trade ahead of you, Chapter 12 is about the con artists who trick you into trading badly. Bluffers are profit-motivated traders who create false impressions to fool other traders. And Harris walks through their playbook in detail that is genuinely uncomfortable.
This is the final chapter. Demaria wraps up the whole book by looking forward. Where is private equity going? What are the big risks ahead? And could the industry actually destroy itself by being too successful? Let’s go through it.
Previous: EM Credit Part 1 Next: Portfolio Construction
Book: Trading Fixed Income and FX in Emerging Markets Authors: Dirk Willer, Ram Bala Chandran, Kenneth Lam Publisher: Wiley (2020) ISBN: 978-1-119-59905-0
Book: Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition Author: Jeff Madura (Florida Atlantic University) Publisher: Cengage Learning, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-133-94788-2
If you have ever wondered how money actually moves through the economy, this is the book that breaks it all down. Financial Markets and Institutions by Jeff Madura is a college textbook that has been around for over a decade, and the 11th edition is one of the most complete versions.
Chapter 6 of The Hedge Fund Book is all about due diligence. Basically, it is the homework you do before handing someone your money. And after Madoff, after LTCM, after Bayou, everyone agrees on one thing. That homework was not being done properly. This chapter shows what good due diligence looks like and what happens when people skip it.
At this point in the book, we have collected the basic info from the hedge fund manager, done an initial review, and had a phone interview. Now comes the numbers part. Chapter 6 of “Hedge Fund Analysis” by Frank J. Travers is about crunching performance data, and it is packed with formulas and statistics.
So I just finished reading “Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners” by Larry Harris. And I have thoughts.
This is one of those books that’s been sitting on finance reading lists for years. Published in 2003 by Oxford University Press (ISBN: 0-19-514470-8), it’s basically the textbook on how markets actually work. Not the “buy low sell high” stuff you see on social media. The real mechanics. How orders flow, why spreads exist, what dealers actually do, and why some traders consistently lose money to others.
Every industry has a chapter it would rather skip. For private equity, this is that chapter. Demaria titles it “Private Equity and Ethics: A Culture Clash,” and he does not hold back. Fraud, job destruction, fake philanthropy, and the long fight for transparency. Let’s go through it.
In Part 1, we watched Travers set up and begin his initial phone call with Jaime Williams from Fictional Capital Management. Now we pick up where we left off, with the conversation getting into the really meaty stuff: asset growth, liquidity, short selling, risk management, and the all-important question of what makes this fund special.
Chapter 5 of “The Hedge Fund Book” opens with a Muhammad Ali quote about suffering through training to become a champion. That sets the tone perfectly. Starting a hedge fund is not glamorous. It’s years of grinding before anything clicks.
Here’s the thing about EM credit that nobody tells you upfront: the structural trade is basically dead. You’d think that because emerging markets grow faster than developed ones, their credit spreads would keep compressing over time. More growth, less risk, tighter spreads. Makes sense, right?
Chapter 11 is about the market’s parasites. Not informed traders who make prices more accurate. Not dealers who provide liquidity. These are the order anticipators: traders who profit by getting in front of other people’s trades. They do not improve anything. They just take.
Private equity used to be the quiet kid in the back of the finance classroom. Small groups of rich people pooling money together to buy companies, fix them up, sell them. Nobody outside the industry really cared. That changed. PE firms got huge, went public, and started buying companies the size of small countries. Chapter 6 of Demaria’s book asks the obvious question: is private equity going mainstream? And if so, what does that mean for everyone involved?
Previous: Real Rates - Simply Superior
So you know the big picture stuff about trading EM rates. You’ve got your frameworks, your carry analysis, your real rate models. But what do you actually do when stuff happens? When CPI prints hot, when a central bank drops a surprise, when a country gets added to a bond index, when an earthquake hits?
You have done your homework. You read the DDQ, you looked at the presentation, you reviewed the monthly letters, and the numbers did not scare you away. Now what?
Chapter 10 is about the most important thing markets do: make prices reflect reality. And it is about the people who make that happen. Informed traders.
Chapter 4 of The Hedge Fund Book is called “The Shooting Star.” And the title tells you everything. Some hedge funds grow super fast, look amazing for a while, and then crash. Like a shooting star. Bright, quick, gone.
You want to buy a company. Or at least a piece of one. How does that actually work? Chapter 5 of Demaria’s book lays it out in 7 steps. The whole thing takes 3 to 18 months depending on the deal. And really, the entire process boils down to one word: trust. Buyer and seller have to trust each other enough to make a deal happen. Let’s walk through it.
In Part 1 we looked at what a Due Diligence Questionnaire (DDQ) is and how Travers uses it to collect initial data on a hedge fund. In this second part, we cover the rest of the DDQ, the other materials you should request, how to analyze performance data, and one of the most useful free tools out there: SEC 13F filings.
Chapter 3 of “The Hedge Fund Book” by Richard C. Wilson is called “Hedge Fund Marketing Pro.” It opens with a quote that basically says there are three ways to raise capital: have rich friends, land early institutional allocations, or do hard work. That sets the tone for the whole chapter. No shortcuts. Just grind.
Previous: EM Rates - Inflation and Central Banks
Chapter 7 is titled “Real Rates: Simply Superior.” That’s not a suggestion. It’s a thesis statement. The authors make a strong case that inflation-linked bonds in emerging markets deserve way more attention than they get. And honestly? The data backs them up.
What does “good” even mean when we talk about a market? This is not a philosophical question. It is a practical one that affects every regulation, every rule change, and every debate about how trading should work. Chapter 9 is Harris building a framework for answering this question, and it turns out to be one of the most important chapters in the book.
This is the final piece of Chapter 4. We covered venture capital, growth capital, LBOs and special situations before. Now Demaria walks us through the rest of the private markets universe: private debt, real assets, and a handful of other instruments that sit at the edges of the asset class.
Previous: EM Rates and the Fed Cycle
In the first half of this chapter, we talked about how the monetary policy cycle works in EM and how it mirrors (but isn’t identical to) the US cycle. Now we get to the really juicy stuff: why inflation behaves so differently in EM, how to forecast it, and when to actually put trades on around central bank pivots.
So you have narrowed your list of hedge fund candidates. You ran the screens, looked at the charts, compared the numbers. Now what?
Here’s a stat that surprised me. A 2006 study by Capco found that more than half of hedge fund failures happen because of operational problems, not bad investment picks. Think about that. Most funds don’t blow up because the portfolio manager made a bad bet. They blow up because the back office was a mess.
Here is a question that sounds simple but almost nobody answers honestly: why do you trade?
Not “to make money.” That is what everyone says. Harris dedicates Chapter 8 to pulling apart all the different reasons people actually show up to the market. And the taxonomy he builds is genuinely useful. Because if you do not understand why you trade, you are probably doing it wrong. And if you cannot figure out why the person on the other side of your trade is trading, you have no idea whether you are the smart money or the dumb money.
Most brokers are honest. But the relationship between broker and client has a built-in conflict that can’t be fully eliminated. The second half of Chapter 7 in “Trading and Exchanges” covers this conflict, the ways dishonest brokers exploit it, and the systems markets have built to keep everyone (mostly) honest.
If venture capital is the glamorous part of private equity, LBOs are where the real money lives. According to Demaria, leveraged buyouts represent roughly 69% of all PE fund investments. This is the heavy machinery of finance, and Chapter 4 spends serious time explaining how it works.
Chapter 3 kicks off Part Two of the book, and this is where things get practical. We are done with the history lessons and strategy overviews. Now Travers rolls up his sleeves and shows us how to actually evaluate a hedge fund step by step.
Chapter 1 of “The Hedge Fund Book” by Richard C. Wilson kicks things off with the basics. And honestly, if you’ve ever wondered what a hedge fund actually is without getting a headache from finance jargon, this chapter does a solid job explaining it.
Chapter 6 is where the book gets into the real meat of EM rates trading. And the first thing it tells you might be surprising: before you can trade EM rates, you need to understand US rates. Because the Fed drives everything.
Brokers are the middlemen of trading. You might think of them as a necessary evil, but Larry Harris makes a compelling case in Chapter 7 of “Trading and Exchanges” that they provide services most traders simply cannot replicate on their own. Understanding what brokers do, and what they might do to you, is essential whether you’re a retail trader or managing billions.
Chapter 4 is where Demaria gets into the actual strategies private equity funds use to make money. He starts with the one everyone has heard of: venture capital. The stuff that turns garage projects into billion-dollar companies. Or, more often, burns through cash and produces nothing.
EM policymakers really, really care about their exchange rates. Way more than developed market policymakers do. And for good reason. FX matters more for inflation in emerging markets. There’s way more USD-denominated debt floating around. And politically, a collapsing currency is basically a death sentence for the sitting government. The FX rate is the most visible report card for whether the government is doing a good job.
The introduction of The Hedge Fund Book starts with a pretty bold question. What if you could sit down with 30 hedge fund veterans and just ask them everything? What if someone spent over $80,000 hiring professionals with 7 to 30 years of experience to share their best advice?
Chapter 1 gave us the history. Now in Chapter 2, Travers answers the big question: what actually is a hedge fund, and why would anyone put money into one?
So you want to know if a private equity fund is actually good? Turns out, that’s way harder than it sounds. There is no stock ticker refreshing every second. No public quarterly earnings call. You are stuck with imperfect tools and incomplete data. Welcome to Section 3.3 through 3.5 of Demaria’s book.
In Part 1, we covered the earliest roots of hedge funds, from Japanese rice traders to Karl Karsten’s statistical forecasting and Benjamin Graham’s value-oriented approach. Now we get to the person who took all those ideas and built something that actually changed Wall Street forever.
Previous: How to Trade EMFX Part 1
In Part 1 we covered carry strategies and how they’ve been slowly dying. Now let’s get into the stuff that actually works better: growth, valuation, momentum, flows, seasonality, and volatility. This is where the chapter gets really interesting.
Order-driven markets are where most of the action happens. Almost every major exchange in the world is order-driven. If you understand how these markets match buyers to sellers and price the resulting trades, you understand the mechanics of modern trading. Chapter 6 of “Trading and Exchanges” breaks it all down.
The preface of “The Hedge Fund Book” starts with Richard Wilson explaining why he wrote this thing in the first place. And honestly, his reason is pretty relatable. He read most hedge fund books out there over seven years and couldn’t find one that gave you straight, unfiltered advice from actual hedge fund managers.
So you have a bunch of big investors who want to put money into private equity but don’t want to pick companies themselves. What do they do? They hand their money to a fund manager and say “go make us rich.” Sounds simple. But the details of how that relationship works, how the fund manager gets paid, and what stops them from just enriching themselves at your expense? That is where it gets interesting.
Chapter 1 of Travers’s book opens with a quote from Mark Twain: “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.” And then Travers immediately proves it by describing a 1970 article from Fortune magazine that sounds like it was written yesterday. Hedge funds losing money, managers getting overconfident, regulators circling. That article is from 1970. Let that sink in.
Chapter 4 is where this book gets really practical. The authors stop talking about what drives EM and start talking about how to trade it. And they begin with the most famous strategy in FX: the carry trade.
Not all markets work the same way. The rules, the systems, and the structure of a market determine who can trade, what information they can see, and who actually makes money. Chapter 5 of “Trading and Exchanges” lays out a framework for understanding market structures. And once you understand this framework, you can look at any market in the world and quickly figure out how it works.
I just finished reading “The Hedge Fund Book: A Training Manual for Professionals and Capital-Raising Executives” by Richard C. Wilson. And I wanted to share what I learned from it in a way that actually makes sense to normal people.
Here’s something most people don’t realize. If you have a pension, pay insurance premiums, or even have a retirement savings account, there’s a good chance some of your money is sitting in private equity right now. You didn’t choose it. Nobody asked you. But that’s how the system works.
There are somewhere between 8,000 and 10,000 hedge funds out there. Let that sink in for a second. Even if you had infinite money, how would you figure out which ones are actually good?
Every trade starts with an order. And if you don’t understand orders, you’re basically showing up to a poker game without knowing the rules. Chapter 4 of Larry Harris’s “Trading and Exchanges” is all about orders, what they are, and the properties that make each type useful (or dangerous) in different situations.
In Part 1, we covered how China became the most important emerging market on the planet. Its economy is so large that it basically drives the entire EM asset class. We looked at trade links, commodity demand, leverage concerns, the current account surplus disappearing, and the capital account slowly opening up.
In part 1 we talked about how the US basically invented private equity. Now the question is: can everyone else just copy the homework? Demaria’s answer is basically “it’s complicated.” Europe tried to adapt the American model. Emerging markets are still figuring things out. And the results are… mixed.
Book: Trading Fixed Income and FX in Emerging Markets Authors: Dirk Willer, Ram Bala Chandran, Kenneth Lam Publisher: Wiley (2020) ISBN: 978-1-119-59905-0
I just finished reading “Hedge Fund Analysis: An In-Depth Guide to Evaluating Return Potential and Assessing Risks” by Frank J. Travers, and I want to break it down for you in a series of blog posts.
This is Part 2 of our coverage of Chapter 3 in Trading and Exchanges. Part 1 covered the players, trade facilitators, and instruments. Now we get into where trading actually happens and who makes the rules.
Chapter 2 of Demaria’s book opens with a fun question: is modern private equity a French invention? The word “entrepreneur” is French. The guy who basically created modern venture capital, Georges Doriot, was French. But he did it in America. At Harvard, not in Paris. That tells you something about where the conditions were right.
In Part 1, we covered how US rates and the dollar cycle drive emerging markets. Now we get to the rest of the global macro toolkit: commodities, the VIX, and a sleeper driver that most people underrate: US high yield spreads.
Chapter 3 of Trading and Exchanges is the chapter where Larry Harris dumps the entire trading industry on your desk and says, “Here is how it all fits together.” It is dense with jargon and institutional detail. Harris even admits you can skip it if you already know the industry. But for everyone else, this chapter provides the context that makes everything after it make sense.
Chapter 1 of Cyril Demaria’s book opens with a story you probably did not expect in a finance textbook. Christopher Columbus. Yep, the guy with the ships.
Previous: EMFX and Fixed Income - Where the Opportunities Are
Book: Trading Fixed Income and FX in Emerging Markets | Authors: Dirk Willer, Ram Bala Chandran, Kenneth Lam | Publisher: Wiley, 2020 | ISBN: 978-1-119-59905-0
Chapter 2 of Trading and Exchanges is basically Larry Harris saying: “Let me show you what actually happens when someone trades.” And it is one of the most eye-opening chapters in the book, especially if you have only ever traded through an app where you tap “buy” and shares magically appear in your account.
Emerging market debt is one of those things that sounds exotic until you look at the numbers. Then it just sounds obvious.
Larry Harris opens Trading and Exchanges with a simple observation: markets are fascinating. They change constantly as prices adjust to new information, as winning traders replace losing traders, and as new technologies evolve. That is a pretty understated way to describe the most complex competitive arena in the world.
You would think that a thing called “private equity” would be easy to define. It has two words. One means private. The other means equity. Should be simple, right?
I just finished reading “Introduction to Private Equity, Debt, and Real Assets” by Cyril Demaria (3rd edition, Wiley, ISBN 978-1-119-53737-3) and I wanted to share what I learned.
So you want to understand how markets actually work. Not the “buy low, sell high” platitude your uncle repeats at Thanksgiving. Not the Reddit version where everything is either a short squeeze or a conspiracy. The real mechanics. How orders get filled, why prices move, who makes money, and who gets eaten alive.
Most books about trading fall into one of two buckets. Either they’re pure theory with no real application. Or they’re war stories that sound cool but don’t help you build actual strategies. This book is neither.